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ABSTRACT
Critics of globalization claim that US manufacturing firms are being driven to shift employment abroad
by the prospects of cheaper labor. Others argue that the availability of low-wage labor has allowed
US based firms to survive and even prosper. Yet evidence for either hypothesis, beyond anecdotes,
is slim. Using firm-level data collected by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), we estimate
the impact on US manufacturing employment of changes in foreign affiliate wages, controlling for
changing demand conditions and technological change. We find that the evidence supports both perspectives
on globalization. For firms most likely to perform the same tasks in foreign affiliates and at home
("horizontal" foreign investment), foreign and domestic employees appear to be substitutes. For these
firms, lower wages in affiliate locations are associated with lower employment in the US. However,
for firms which do significantly different tasks at home and abroad ("vertical" foreign investment),
foreign and domestic employment are complements. For vertical foreign investment, lower wages
abroad are associated with higher US manufacturing employment. These offsetting effects may be
combined to show that offshoring is associated with a quantitatively small decline in manufacturing
employment. Other factors, such as declining prices for consumer goods, import competition, and
falling prices for investment goods (which substitute for labor) play a more important role.
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  During the last three decades, domestic manufacturing employment of US-based multinationals 
has fallen steadily.
1 Between 1982 and 1999, foreign manufacturing employment of US multinationals 
increased from 26 percent to nearly 40 percent of their labor force. These parallel developments have led 
critics of globalization to conclude that US firms are shutting down factories at home and shifting 
employment abroad in order to lower labor costs. Concerns about offshoring have intensified as newly 
released data indicate a further decline in manufacturing employment both by US-based multinationals 
and for the US economy as a whole. 
  The public outcry motivated Congress to take action.  On October 22, 2004 the US Congress passed 
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.  The Act contains a provision to encourage profit repatriation 
back to the US by domestic multinationals--explicitly for the purpose of job creation at home. Yet the 
evidence linking offshore activities to falling domestic labor demand is, in fact, contradictory.  Several 
studies suggest that there are no employment losses from offshoring activities.  The first important 
research to illustrate this point is Brainard and Riker (1997), who showed that employment in low and 
high income affiliates of US multinationals is complementary for manufacturing activities.  Borga (2005) 
and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005) also find that expansion of US multinationals abroad stimulates job 
growth at home.  Reviewing these studies, Mankiw and Swagel (2006) conclude that “foreign activity 
does not crowd out domestic activity; the reverse is true.” 
  A second set of studies (Brainard and Riker (2001), Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2003), 
Muendler and Becker (2006)) reaches the opposite conclusion: jobs abroad replace jobs at home, but the 
effect is small.   These different answers are problematic for policymakers who are left uncertain about 
how to respond to the growing ranks of US firms setting up shop abroad.   How can we reconcile these 
two different sets of findings?  We believe that the answer lies in understanding the different motivations 
for foreign investment. 
                                                           
1 See Table 1, which shows a four million worker decline between 1982 and 1999.     3
  Theoretical models of trade and foreign investment imply that different types of foreign 
investments will be associated with opposite effects on domestic labor demand.  Markusen and Maskus 
(2001) separate multinationals into vertically- and horizontally-integrated types.  They show how 
different incentives for foreign investment lead to different organizational structures, which in turn 
produce different degrees of substitution between employment at home and abroad.  Horizontal 
multinationals, which are defined as firms which produce the same products in different locations, are 
primarily motivated by trade costs to locate abroad.
2  For these types of firms, investment abroad 
substitutes for exports.  One implication is that foreign affiliate employment should substitute for home 
employment. For vertically-integrated firms, however, trade and foreign investment are complements.  
Vertically-integrated enterprises are motivated by factor endowment differences (and consequently factor 
price differences in a world where there is not factor price equalization) to locate different components of 
production in different locations. As pointed out by Brainard and Riker (1997), one implication of this 
kind of multinational activity is that parent and affiliate employment should be complementary.    
  More recent work by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) draws on insights from Autor, Levy 
and Murnane (2002) to develop a framework in which falling costs of offshoring can lead to wage gains 
for workers at home.  Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) use Autor, Levy and Murnane’s 
differentiation between routine and non-routine tasks to build a theoretical model of trade in tasks.   
Advances in technology (such as improvements in communication) make offshoring of routine tasks less 
costly, leading firms to shift production abroad.  What is surprising is that offshoring of routine tasks for 
vertically-integrated multinationals (there is no horizontal motive for foreign investment here) leads to 
ambiguous predictions for domestic wages.  The intuition behind this result is that falling costs of 
offshoring act like a positive productivity shock, reducing costs of intermediate goods production.   
Although the primary motivation for offshoring is to reduce labor costs, low-skill workers at home may 
still gain if terms of trade effects and labor supply effects are not too large.  
  In this paper, we develop an empirical framework which is flexible enough to allow different 
elasticities of substitution (or complementarity) between home and affiliate employment for firms that 
have different motivations to engage in foreign activities.  With this framework, we are able to identify 
                                                           
2 For the purpose of simplicity, we will occasionally refer to horizontally-integrated firms as horizontal firms, and   4
the separate effects of horizontal versus vertical foreign investment on home employment, and also allow 
for different degrees of substitution (or complementarity) in high- and low-income affiliate locations. At 
the same time, we control for other confounding changes, such as other factor price changes, demand 
shocks, and technological change.  To address the possibility that methodological differences might be 
driving the conflicting results described above, we adopt a variety of different approaches to estimating 
labor demand and a range of econometric techniques.   
  We find that the insights derived from trade theory go a long way towards explaining the apparently 
contradictory evidence on the relationship between offshoring and domestic manufacturing employment.  
For US parents involved in primarily horizontal activities, affiliate activity abroad substitutes for domestic 
employment.  For vertically-integrated parents, however, the results suggest that home and foreign 
employment are complementary.  Foreign wage reductions are associated with an increase in domestic 
employment.  The results differ across high- and low-income affiliate locations, in part because factor-
price differences relative to the US are much more important in low-income regions.  Nevertheless, the 
negative effects for horizontal foreign investment are small: a 10 percent reduction in wages in affiliate 
locations is associated with only a 0.2 percent reduction in US parent employment.   
  We also show that offshoring is not the primary driver of declining domestic employment of US 
manufacturing multinationals between 1977 and 1999.  In fact, there is some evidence that operating in 
low-income affiliate locations preserves jobs, instead of destroying them.  We show that declining 
domestic employment of US multinationals is primarily due to falling prices of investment goods (such as 
computers, which substitute for labor), falling prices of consumption goods, and increasing import 
penetration. Our research highlights both the importance of heterogeneous firm responses to opportunities 
for direct investment abroad and the need to account for other avenues through which international 
competition affects US labor demand. 
  Our results are consistent with the literature that focuses on the impact of international trade on US 
jobs.  Revenga (1992) finds a negative impact of changes in import prices on US employment growth.  
Katz and Murphy (1992) also find that increased import competition negatively affected relative labor 
demand in the US, particularly in the 1980s with the growing of the US trade deficit.  Borjas, Freeman 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
vertically-integrated firms as vertical.   5
and Katz (1997) find that increased trade with developing countries depresses wages at the bottom of the 
income distribution. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) examine the impact of US imports on both the 
survival and employment of US manufacturing firms. They find that imports only harm US 
manufacturing employment when those imports are from low wage countries.  
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis data on outward direct investment and our choice of sample.  Section III describes the 
empirical framework and discusses econometric issues. Section IV presents the results and Section V 
concludes. 
 
II.  The BEA Data 
 
  We analyze firm-level surveys on US direct investment abroad, collected each year by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the US Department of Commerce. The BEA collects confidential data on 
the activities of US-based multinationals, defined as the combination of a single US entity that has made 
the direct investment, called the parent, and at least one foreign business enterprise, called the foreign 
affiliate. We use the data collected on majority-owned, non-bank foreign affiliates and non-bank US 
parents for the benchmark years from 1982 and 1999.  These benchmark years (1982, 1989, 1994 and 
1999) include more comprehensive information than the annual surveys.
3  
Creating a panel using the benchmark years of the BEA survey data is a nontrivial task for several 
reasons.  First, not all firms are required to report to the BEA and reporting requirements vary across 
years. Second, we must consider the implications of the changes to the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes in 1972 and 1987 and the switch from SIC codes to the North American Industrial 
Classification System (NAICS) codes in 1997. The fact that parents are allowed to consolidate 
information for several affiliates in one country on a single form calls for special care in the aggregation 
and interpretation of affiliate level data. 
All foreign affiliates with sales, assets or net income in excess of a certain amount in absolute 
value must report their data to the BEA. This amount was $3 million dollars in 1982, 1989 and 1994 and   6
rose to $7 million dollars in 1999. In addition, a new reporting requirement was imposed on parents in 
1999. Parents whose sales, assets or net income exceeded $100 million (in absolute value) were required 
to provide more extensive information than parents whose sales, assets or net income fell below that 
level.
4 To determine whether the changes in reporting requirements biased made small firms 
overrepresented in our sample in the early years, we imposed a double filter on the data using the uniform 
cutoff for affiliates (based on the strictest reporting requirement of $100 million in 1999) of $5.59 million 
in 1982 US dollars and $79.87 1982 US dollars for parents. As it turns out, the reporting requirements 
were large enough that imposing the filter on the data makes little difference on our initial results. 
Therefore, we use all of the available data.  
Finally, we face selection issues with our sample of “manufacturing” firms.
5 We keep those 
parents whose primary industry of sales is manufacturing since our goal is to determine whether 
manufacturing jobs at home are being replaced by manufacturing jobs abroad. However, some parents 
were reclassified from manufacturing to wholesale trade and services. To account for this, we keep all 
parents that were ever classified in manufacturing and their manufacturing affiliates.
6  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 While the BEA collects annual data on US direct investment abroad, these data do not include all the variables we 
need and can find in the benchmark years. 
4 Parents who do not meet this cutoff but who have affiliates that meet the $7 million cutoff are still required to 
provide extensive information for affiliates. 
5 To document what has happened within industries in manufacturing over time, we created a concordance that 
allows us to assign SIC codes to NAICS codes.  This was necessary because in 1999 the BEA collected data on 
NAICS codes and not SIC codes.  We chose to convert SIC codes to NAICS codes since all future information will 
be collected on the basis of NAICS codes.  For example, data for the benchmark year 2004 will be available shortly 
and firms report based on NAICS codes.  The 1977 and 1982 benchmark years are based on the 1972 SIC codes.  
The 1989 and 1994 benchmark years are based on the 1987 SIC codes. The 1999 benchmark data are based on the 
1997 NAICS codes.  In addition to the fact that the industry codes are not directly comparable across all benchmark 
years, the BEA industry codes have been slightly modified to reflect the fact that these are enterprise data and are 
called, respectively, SIC-ISI and NAICS-ISI.  Working with these codes, we created a program (available upon 
request) that assigns the SIC-ISI codes for the years 1977-1994 to NAICS-ISI codes.  Both parents and affiliates are 
classified into their primary industry of sales using the following algorithm, which tracks the algorithm used by the 
BEA: the top five industries by parent or affiliate sales are used to assign to each parent or affiliate one of the 22 
aggregates.  Sales are collapsed into the top five industries of sales and then the maximum sale by industry is 
identified.  A parent or affiliate is classified as being in manufacturing if its maximum sales across the top five 
industries of sales is in manufacturing. 
6 There are a number of parents who have been reclassified from manufacturing to wholesale trade and 
services. For example, several firms were in manufacturing but are now classified in wholesale trade because almost 
all of their manufacturing is done overseas and not in the United States. To account for this, we chose our sample in 
two different ways. First, we included parents who either were classified in manufacturing or had previously been 
classified in manufacturing and their manufacturing affiliates. Next, we included only parents who were currently in 
manufacturing in any given year and their manufacturing affiliates. Since the results are not sensitive to this 
distinction, we use the larger of the two samples, keeping all parents that were ever classified in manufacturing and 
their manufacturing affiliates. 
   7
Table 1 reports the number of employees of US manufacturing parents both in the US and in 
foreign affiliate locations.  US employment of manufacturing parents declined from nearly 12 million in 
1982 to slightly below 8 million in 1999.  The second row of Table 1 shows the employment coverage of 
our sample after we perform the cleaning procedures described above.  The sample size remains almost 
the same, particularly in the later years.  The following two rows report the breakdown of US 
employment for horizontal versus vertical multinationals (discussed in more detail below and defined in 
Table 2).  US employment declines are twice as large for horizontal versus vertical multinationals.  While 
US employment of both types of multinationals declined, foreign affiliate employment increased.  Almost 
all the increase in foreign affiliate employment occurred in low-income affiliate locations, and affiliate 
employment gains in vertically-integrated firms were twice as large as for horizontally-integrated firms.  
The fact that US employment of vertical multinationals fell by less but (low-income) affiliate employment 
increased significantly more is consistent with the idea of complementarity between home and foreign 
employment for vertical multinationals, as suggested by Markusen and Maskus (2001) and Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2006).   
The share of US multinational employment concentrated in affiliates increased from 26 percent in 
1982 to 39 percent in 1999.  Although total affiliate employment increased by more than one million 
employees, the foreign employment gains did not fully offset the domestic losses.  This suggests that 
there are other important determinants of falling domestic employment for US multinationals.  Alternative 
explanations, which shall be incorporated into our empirical framework, include changing prices of 
capital, labor-saving technical change, changing terms of trade, and increased import competition.  
Manufacturing multinationals reporting to the BEA accounted for the majority of economic 
activity in US manufacturing during the sample period.  Appendix Table A.1 (based on Mataloni and 
Fahim-Nader (1996) and Mataloni and Yorgason (2006)) reports the coverage of the BEA data for 
benchmark years 1982 through 1999.  In 1982, gross product by these enterprises accounted for over 80 
percent of total manufacturing and 77 percent of manufactured exports in the United States.  By 1999, the 
BEA’s coverage had declined slightly: these enterprises accounted for only 63 percent of US exports and 
about half of manufacturing employment. These firms also accounted for more than 80 percent of total 
private US research and development expenditures throughout the sample period (Mataloni and Fahim-  8
Nader (1996)). Appendix Table A.1 also shows that the proportion of services firms accounted for by the 
BEA sample is extremely small.  During the sample period, the BEA sample accounted for only between 
6 and 8 percent of total gross product in services.  Consequently, we restrict our analysis to 
manufacturing, which we believe provides a more representative sample.   
How reliable are these data?  These are the only data officially collected by a US government 
agency on affiliate activity abroad.  We have initiated a number of data checks to analyze the reliability of 
the coverage.
7,
8  We were able to cross-check the employment numbers for US affiliate activity reported 
by the BEA with data on inward foreign investment reported by the official statistical agencies in 
Germany and Sweden.  These checks are reported in Appendix Table A.2.  We report total employment in 
both countries as indicated by the BEA database and show that it is quite close to the same numbers 
collected by the national statistical agencies.  Although there are some discrepancies between BEA and 
German and Swedish data, this may be, at least partially, accounted for by variation in reporting based 
upon fiscal year vs. calendar year. The BEA classifies a firm in 1999 if its fiscal year ends in 1999—this 
could be for any month in 1999.  Although most firms have their fiscal year ending in December, enough 
have earlier end dates that some of the 1999 BEA employment figures correspond to a mix of the 1998 




III. Empirical  Framework 
 
Previous work has used very different econometric models to specify the impact of foreign 
affiliate activity on labor demand at home, making it difficult to identify whether the conflicting results 
stem from different approaches or different datasets and time periods.  Brainard and Riker (1997) estimate 
labor demand as a function of wages in different locations, Desai, et al. (2006) estimate a reduced form 
                                                           
7 We are particularly grateful to Marc Muendler and Karolina Eckholm for helping us do this cross-checking.  They 
provided the data on the activities of US multinational affiliates in Germany and Sweden. 
8 We also contacted Statistics Canada to check whether they record information on affiliates of US multinationals in 
Canada, which would allow us to cross-check US data on foreign affiliates there with Canadian data on inward   9
equation with log labor at home as a function of log labor abroad, and Brainard and Riker (2001), 
Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2003) and Muendler and Becker (2006) use a translog cost function 
approach to derive factor shares as a function of wages in different locations. Katz and Murphy (1992) 
and Card (2001), focusing on the effects of immigration and trade, both use a CES functional form to 
derive an equilibrium relationship between the ratio of employment at home to employment abroad and 
the ratio of wages at home to wages abroad.  
We chose as our primary specification to derive labor demand from a generalized cost function.  
Our preferred approach is attractive for several reasons.  It puts minimal restrictions on the nature of the 
production function, unlike the CES specification which imposes a constant elasticity of substitution 
across different factor inputs.    In the translog approach, we worry that identifying elasticities of 
substitution or complementarity and calculating standard errors is a less transparent process (depending, 
among other things, on the choice of factor shares) than estimating a labor demand equation.  Previous 
approaches in the offshoring literature have imposed a short-run cost function and kept capital inputs 
fixed, which would make it difficult for us to compare our results to earlier coefficient estimates.  
However, for completeness we also derive estimating equations using a generalized translog and CES 
function approach.  We shall see that the implied elasticities of complementarity (or substitution) are 
remarkably robust across these different specifications. 
Modifying Hamermesh (1993), let us consider a firm using N domestic factors and N* foreign 
factors of production X1…XN , X1*…XN* . We begin by assuming there are only two locations (domestic 
and foreign) but will generalize to j locations in the empirical specification which follows.  Let the 
production function for a US multinational firm i producing total aggregate worldwide output Yi and using 
N domestic and N* foreign inputs Xi and Xi* be 
11 * * (1) ( ,...., ,...., ), 0, 0 ii i ii N i i N i Yf X X X X f f => <  
Output Y can include production at home and abroad and production could be exported or sold on 
domestic markets.  Then the associated cost function, based on the demands for X1 through XN and X1* 
through XN* is given by  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
foreign investment.  Statistics Canada informed us that they do not gather data on affiliates because it is too difficult 
to define a foreign affiliate and referred us to the BEA.  10
11 * * (2) ( ,...., , ,...., , ), 0 ii ii N i i N i Cg w w w wY g =>  
where the wi’s and  wi*’s are the N and N* input prices at home and in the foreign affiliate location.  One 
can use Shepard’s lemma to derive the factor demand for the nth input for US multinational firm i: 
 
11 * * (3) ( ,...., , ,...., , ), 1,..., , * 1,..., *
d
i ni ni i Ni i Ni X Xw ww wYn N n N == =  
 
Our first approach will be to estimate a log-linear version of equation (3), focusing on US labor demand 
and extending (3) to allow for three locations.  With three locations, there are three types of labor inputs: 
home labor, foreign labor in low-income affiliates, and foreign labor in high-income affiliates. This 
framework is flexible enough to allow for a range of production technologies, including Brainard and 
Riker’s (1997) assumption that production is vertically decomposed across high-wage and low-wage 
regions. We will also allow for two other types of inputs, making the total number of inputs N in each 
location equal to three: labor, physical capital, and research and development inputs. As with wages, we 
allow physical capital and research and development inputs to be separately identified depending on 
location.    
One estimation issue which arises is that global output Y for firm i is jointly determined with 
domestic US employment.  If we were to estimate (3) directly, we would have a significant simultaneity 
problem.  We solve this by assuming that aggregate worldwide output Y for firm i is a function of 
domestic and foreign prices: 




Substituting this into (3) yields: 
 
11 * * (4) ( ,...., , ,...., , , *), 1,..., , * 1,..., *
d
ni ni i Ni i Ni X Xw ww w P Pn N n N == = . 
  11
Our first set of estimating equations is based on log-linearization of (4), generalizing to j 
locations, and takes the following form: 
 
0 (5) ln ln iht j jt j ijt j ijt j ijt t i ijt
jj j j
LP w r t d f β αη ω χ ε =+ + + + + + + ∑∑ ∑ ∑ . 
The dependent variable lnL is the natural logarithm of net annual employment by the US parent in the 
United States, the P’s are final goods prices, w is the wage in location j and time t,  r is the price of capital 
in location j and time t, and t is the price of research and development goods.   We allow for time effects d 
and a firm-specific (common to the parent and its affiliate) fixed effect fi, which takes into account both 
firm-specific productivity differences and other non-varying firm characteristics, while j indexes location 
and t indexes time.  
 
Defining Horizontal and Vertical Multinationals 
 
  Markusen and Maskus (2001), in their comprehensive survey of general equilibrium approaches 
to the multinational firm, define horizontal multinationals as “firms that produce the same product in 
multiple plants, serving local markets by local production.”   This definition of horizontal integration 
implies that intra-firm trade will be low, since foreign investment substitutes for US exports.  Vertical 
firms are defined as “firms that fragment the production process into stages based on factor intensities and 
locate activities according to international differences in factor prices.”  An important finding of 
Markusen and Maskus is that foreign investment replaces trade in the case of horizontal multinationals 
but is positively correlated with trade in the case of vertical foreign investment.  Although we cannot 
directly test the motivation for foreign investment with our data, we can use the different implications for 
intra-firm trade as a way to distinguish vertical from horizontal foreign investment. 
We construct intra-firm trade as the sum of exports to foreign affiliates for further processing plus 
imports from foreign affiliates as a share of sales.  We then define firms as vertical if they have a high 
share of intra-firm trade and firms as horizontal if they have a low share.  Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2006) also use intra-firm trade to quantify the increase in vertical activities of multinationals, pointing 
out that intra-firm trade “mostly reflects the international division of labor within multinational  12
enterprises.”  We measure high intra-firm trade in two ways.  First we run a regression of intra-firm trade 
on industry dummies, and define firms as vertical if the industry dummy is statistically significant.  As 
reported in Table 2, this is equivalent to selecting those industries with a high average share of intra-firm 
trade during the sample period as vertical multinationals. 
The results in Table 2 suggest that the following industries may be characterized as vertical: 
chemicals, plastics, primary and fabricated metals, machinery, computers and electronics, electrical 
equipment, and transportation equipment.  The remaining industries are classified as horizontal: textiles 
and apparel, food, beverages and tobacco, leather products, wood and paper products, petroleum products, 
non-metallic metals and furniture. While it may be surprising that apparel is classified as horizontal and 
not vertical, potential vertical activity in that sector is limited by high trade costs.  Much horizontal FDI is 
motivated by trade barriers (such as tariffs or quotas). Textiles and apparel and beverages and tobacco are 
typically the most protected sectors in both industrial and developing countries (for developing countries, 
see Hanson and Harrison (2001)). To make this point more clearly, we have also listed in the last three 
columns a summary measure of tariffs for China, an average for all developing countries, and tariffs in 
the United States.  The average tariffs by sector for developing countries and China is for 1999 and is 
taken from the World Bank’s trade database.  The measure of tariffs for the US includes tariffs and 
transport costs for each sector for the US in 1979, based on Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006).  For the 
United States, we selected an earlier year to indicate more clearly the differences in the pattern of 
protection across sectors; in more recent years, tariffs in the United States have been reduced to very low 
levels.  Trade frictions are highest for textiles and apparel, beverages and tobacco, leather, and non-
metallic minerals (cement).  This implies that firms in highly protected sectors (textiles and apparel) or in 
sectors with high costs of transportation (cement) must frequently engage in horizontal investments in 
order to access domestic foreign markets. 
It is also instructive to compare our classification of horizontal versus vertical with the 
classification used by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) to categorize workers into routine and non-
routine tasks.  They argue that computers are likely to substitute for labor in the case of routine tasks, 
which could be either cognitive or manual, and most likely to be complementary with labor in the case of 
cognitive non-routine tasks.  As pointed out by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), “routine” tasks are  13
more likely to be offshored via vertical foreign investment (there is no motivation for horizontal foreign 
investment in their framework).  We posit that the type of routine tasks that are important in 
manufacturing are manual rather than cognitive.  We pick a measure of non-routine manual tasks which 
measures eye-hand-foot coordination (EFT).  It is possible to use the Autor, et al. data to classify 
industries according to their EFT level, by merging CPS worker and occupation data with their industry 
affiliation. In Table 2, firms defined as vertically-integrated on the basis of high intra-firm trade measure 
poorly in the EFT scale.  So our measure of vertical versus horizontal could also be interpreted as a 
measure of distance from non-routine manual tasks. 
 
Data and Estimation Issues 
To estimate equation (5) we need data on US employment, capital prices, wages, final goods 
prices, and research and development prices.  We need factor prices and output prices for each of the j 
locations in which the multinational firm has operations.  We measure US employment as the (log) 
number of individuals employed by the parent in the US, since hours or even employment broken down 
by skill levels are not collected for US parents.  Domestic prices of investment are defined at the 
disaggregated industry level and are taken from the NBER’s manufacturing database.  Domestic US 
wages are also taken from the NBER’s manufacturing database, and are available at the disaggregated 
industry level. 
  While in principle there could be as many factor and final goods prices as there are countries in 
the BEA database, in practice the number of j locations is limited by data availability and the need for 
parsimony in estimation.  We restrict our j locations to 3: domestic (US) activity, high income locations, 
and low-income locations.  One problem is that many firms, especially small enterprises, do not have any 
operations in low-income countries.  To permit us to include these firms in the estimation, we set wages 
for these firms equal to zero and add a dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm has a missing 
observation for low-income affiliates. 
 For  foreign  prices  P* we use the prices of consumption goods, taken from the Penn World 
Tables. We also rely on the Penn World Table measures of foreign investment prices to capture the 
impact of the price of foreign capital.  While in principle all foreign factor prices should be broken down  14
into low-income foreign and high-income foreign affiliate locations, collinearity in investment and 
consumption prices have led us to aggregate these prices across foreign affiliate locations.  Because both 
capital and goods are significantly more mobile than individuals, the factor price differentials across high 
and low-income affiliate locations are much larger for labor inputs.   
In US manufacturing, international competition plays an important role in price determination, so 
we proxy for US industry-level prices using both industry dummies and import competition. These data 
were made available at the 4-digit ISIC level by Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006).  We also include a 
measure of import penetration from low-wage countries, also computed by these authors.  Alternative 
specifications reported later in the paper use industry-level aggregates of output as alternative measures of 
output shocks, with separate industry-level measures of Y calculated for parents and affiliates. 
  We do not have adequate measures of prices for research and development goods.  However, we 
believe that these are important inputs into production and could account for a significant impact on 
manufacturing employment, particularly if research and development inputs are associated with labor-
saving technical change.  Consequently, we proxy for prices of research and development goods with the 
share of research and development employment in total employment at the firm level.  These are 
separately available for both the parent and affiliates in each location.   
Since wages are calculated at the country level using BEA aggregates of the firm-level measures, 
we assume that wages are exogenously determined.  However, we also test for the validity of this 













where w is the wage facing the ith firm at time t in country c in affiliate location j, and the Wct’s 
are country-time specific wages either computed using the BEA data on worker compensation aggregated 
to the country level or the UNIDO wages.  Wages are employment-weighted averages of wages in high- 
and low-income affiliates, where the weights are given by the parent’s initial share of employment within 
countries belonging to each high- and low-income category.  We use initial period employment weights to  15
avoid endogeneity problems.  Affiliate country locations are defined as either high- or low-income based 
on the World Bank’s country classifications (see Table 3).   
IV. Results 
 
  We report sample means in Table 4. The US employment share in worldwide parent activity 
averaged 83.4 percent for horizontally-integrated and 80.7 percent for vertically-integrated firms. Affiliate 
labor expenditure shares accounted for between 14 and 17.2 percent of expenditures, while low-income 
affiliate shares only accounted for the remaining two percent.  During this period, the US parent share of 
worldwide labor expenses fell 4 percent, with most of the 4 percent drop in US parent shares going to 
low-income affiliate locations.  
  US parent employment shares fell considerably more than expenditure shares, falling from 74 to 
61 percent of worldwide parent employment (see Table 1).  The reason why the employment changes 
were large but expenditure share changes were small is because wage trends offset the employment 
developments: real wages in the sample went up in the United States but fell in high-income and low-
income affiliate countries.  The real wage declines abroad were large, particularly in low-income 
locations.  One explanation which is consistent with these wage trends is a change in the composition of 
employment: US parents (and their high-income affiliates) are retaining relatively high-skilled workers 
and shifting relatively low-skilled jobs to low-income countries where labor is less expensive. This was 
particularly true among vertical multinationals, where domestic wages increased by nearly 20 percent in 
real terms over the sample period and low-income affiliate real wages fell by 27 percent.   
  Research and development employment as a share of total parent employment averaged 3.1 
percent for horizontal and 9.1 percent for vertically-integrated US multinationals.  The significantly 
higher R&D shares and much larger domestic (US) wage increases for vertical multinationals is 
consistent with the hypothesis that these types of firms divide their activities between foreign and 
domestic locations, performing the most skill-intensive activities at home.   R&D employment as a share 
of total employment rose in the US but fell in both high- and low-skill affiliate locations, suggesting that 
US parents chose to increasingly concentrate R&D activity in the United States.  16
  Average import penetration in the four-digit SIC sector over the period was 12.7 percent for 
horizontal firms and 17.8 percent for vertical firms.  Import penetration increased by 8.2 percentage 
points for horizontal firms and 14.6 percentage points for vertical firms, which reflects an enormous 
increase in the exposure of US manufacturing firms to import competition.  Import competition from low-
wage countries also increased for both types of enterprises, increasing by 9.9 for horizontal firms and 6.2 
percentage points for vertical firms. While the price of investment goods in the US fell for both sets of 
enterprises, prices fell faster for vertically-integrated firms, reflecting, in part, the importance of falling 
computer-related costs for these firms.  The real price of consumption goods, as reported by the Penn 
World Tables, also fell for both sets of enterprises reflecting not just changes in demand but also advances 
in productivity and increased competition from lower wage countries. 
 
Fixed Effect Results for Labor Demand  
  We report the results of estimating equation (5) in Table 5. The log of US employment is our 
dependent variable and we use a within transformation of the data to eliminate firm fixed effects.  All 
specifications include time dummies to control for year-specific shocks.  The first column of Table 5 
reports coefficient estimates when we pool horizontal and vertical enterprises. The results suggest that 
employees in low-income affiliates are substitutes for parent home employment and employees in high-
income affiliates are complements. The point estimate of 0.017 on low-income affiliate wages indicates 
that a 10 percent fall in foreign wages would lead to a 0.17 percent fall in US parent employment. The 
point estimate on high-income affiliate wages suggests the opposite: that a 10 percent increase in high-
income affiliate wage increases would be associated with a 0.31 percent fall in parent employment.  In 
columns (2) and (3), we allow the slope coefficients of our explanatory variables to vary according to 
whether firms are vertically or horizontally integrated. Formal F-tests of equality of coefficients are 
presented in column (4); in most cases, we reject that the coefficients are the same across the two types of 
enterprises. Consequently, we separately report results for vertically and horizontally integrated parents 
throughout the remainder of the paper.  
  Column (2) reports the results for vertically-integrated multinational enterprises.    The coefficient 
on low-income affiliate wages, at -0.032, suggests that a 10 percent fall in affiliate wage levels would lead  17
to a 0.32 percent increase in domestic (US) labor demand.  For these types of firms, employment in low-
income affiliates is complementary with home employment. The coefficient on high-income wages, while 
also negative, is smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant.  These results suggest that falling 
wages abroad should boost US manufacturing employment for vertically-integrated firms, consistent with 
the predictions in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).  Their model suggests that for vertical 
multinationals, lower wages abroad could act as cost savings that translate into higher employment at 
home. 
  The results are different for horizontal foreign investment, as reported in column (3) of Table 5.  
The coefficient on both high- and low-income affiliate wages is now positive and statistically significant.  
The coefficient on low-income affiliate wages, at 0.027, suggests that a 10 percent fall in affiliate wages 
would be associated with a 0.27 percentage point fall in parent employment.  The coefficient on high-
income affiliate wages is also positive and statistically significant.  These results suggest that affiliate 
employment in horizontally-integrated multinationals substitutes for parent employment.  However, the 
magnitudes are very small: even an implausibly large decline of 50 percent in foreign affiliate wages 
would result in only a 1.5 percent fall in parent employment.  
  The own-wage elasticity, which varies between -0.34 and -0.52, suggests that a one percent 
increase in the domestic US manufacturing wage reduces labor demand by 0.34 to 0.52 percent. The 
magnitude is in line with the dozens of studies cited in Hamermesh (1993), who reports that most studies 
find that the own-wage elasticity for labor lies between 0.3 and 0.7.  The coefficient on the industry-
specific home price of investment is positive for both types of enterprises, suggesting that reductions in 
the price of domestic investment goods reduce domestic labor demand.  The coefficient on investment 
abroad has the opposite sign, suggesting that reductions in the cost of investment abroad are associated 
with increased labor demand at home. The coefficient estimates on the domestic price of investment 
goods imply that in the US, investment and labor are generally substitutes. This is consistent with a story 
in which less skilled workers are being replaced by capital (computers) and consistent with previous labor 
demand studies on capital-labor substitution cited in Hamermesh (1993). 
  Increases in import penetration (arms-length trade) and foreign demand shocks also affect 
domestic labor demand.  A 10 percentage point increase in import penetration during the sample period  18
would imply a decline in US manufacturing employment of 3.5 percentage points for vertical firms.  For 
horizontal enterprises, import penetration from low-wage countries significantly and negatively affected 
labor demand.  The point estimates imply that a 10 percentage point increase in import penetration from 
low-wage countries was associated with a 6.1 percentage point fall in labor demand.  The different effects 
for horizontal and vertical firms across different types of import competition reflect the fact that there was 
significantly more import competition from low wage countries in the industries which we characterize is 
horizontal, including textiles and apparel, leather products, pulp and paper, and woods products.  A one 
percent increase in the prices of consumption goods in affiliate locations is associated with a 0.58 
percentage point increase in employment for vertical multinationals and a 1.15 increase for horizontal 
multinationals.   
  Big negative employment effects are also associated with our domestic proxy for the prices of 
technology inputs, the share of research and development employment in total parent employment.  The 
results indicate that a ten percentage point increase in the parent research and development employment 
shares would be associated with a 3.5 percentage point decline for vertical firms and 9.1 percentage point 
decline for horizontal firms.  For horizontally-integrated firms, parent research and development 
employment as a share of total employment increased by 4.3 percentage points between 1977 and 1999, 
implying a reduction in home employment of 4 percent.  However, the coefficients on affiliate R&D 
employment are either insignificant or positive, suggesting that R&D activities in affiliates are associated 
with positive employment gains for the US parent. 
  The critical parameters of interest in Table 5 are the coefficients on affiliate wages, which 
indicate whether affiliate employment substitutes for or is complementary to home employment.  In Table 
6, we explore whether our results are robust to the definition of affiliate wages.  Instead of constructing 
country-level wages from the BEA sample, we use country wages reported by UNIDO.  Wages are 
calculated based on surveys administered by UNIDO, supplemented with secondary sources (such as 
national statistical agencies) gathered by UNIDO as well.  Wages are calculated as compensation divided 
by number of  employees, collected at the 3 digit ISIC level (Revision 2).  All values are converted to US 
dollars using the IMF exchange rate series rf.  As in Table 5, we weight country-level wages using the 
parent’s initial distribution of employment across affiliate locations when the parent first appears in the  19
sample.  The results in Table 6 are consistent with our earlier results, suggesting that the source for 
country-level wages does not affect our coefficient estimates.  The coefficients on high- and low-income 
affiliate wages are the same sign and close in magnitude to the previous results.  As before, the results 
indicate that home and foreign employment are complements for vertical multinationals but that home 




  We face potentially important selection problems. Between each benchmark year, roughly 20% of 
the parents drop out of our sample and do not reappear. If some of these firms relocate all operations 
abroad and close down their US operations, then our estimates of the employment costs of multinational 
activity could be downward biased. Following Wooldridge (2002, p. 581), we test for survivorship bias 
by including a lead of the selection indicator, si, t+1, in our estimating equations, where si,t+1 is equal to zero 
for firms that do not exit the sample and switches from zero to one in the period just before attrition. The 
results of this test are reported in the third to last row of columns one and three of Appendix Table A5. 
The coefficient on the lead of the selection indicator is negative and significant for both vertically- and 
horizontally-integrated firms.  The significant and negative sign on the selection variable is a possible 
indicator that firms which relocate abroad are those most likely to contract employment.  To address this 
potential criticism, we correct for selection bias below. 
To obtain consistent estimates of our parameters, we use the inverse probability weighting 
scheme outlined in Wooldridge (2002) which consists of the following two-step procedure. In each time 
period, we estimate a binary response model for the probability of survival for the group in the sample at 
time t-1. Using the fitted probabilities from the first step, we obtain the following weights: 




= π π π  
where hats denote fitted probabilities. This methodology allows us to choose covariates in the probits that 
are essentially everything we can observe for units in the sample at time t-1 that might affect attrition. In 
our case, we include all of the regressors in our original model plus firm size, firm profitability and the 
firm’s share of employment in low-income countries.   20
  Columns (2) and (4) of Appendix Table 5 report the estimated coefficients and standard errors 
obtained using the weighting procedure described above. In columns (1) and (3) we report the unweighted 
estimates for purposes of comparison. In general, the point estimates in the weighted regressions are 
larger for home prices and smaller for foreign prices: the implication is that small firms are more sensitive 
to domestic price movements and less sensitive to foreign price movements than large firms. However, in 
most cases the point estimates are not very different from those in Tables 5 and 6.  
  One serious drawback to using the weighted estimates is that the weighting scheme gives an 
inordinate amount of importance to the small firms in our sample. The correction is problematic for the 
following reason: if we define “small” as a firm for which the size of the capital stock is less than the 
mean of the capital stock of all firms, then the “small” firms in our sample account for only 23.8% of 
employment while the large firms account for the remainder. Since small firms are much more likely to 
drop out of our sample, our weighting scheme assigns larger weights to firms with a relatively small share 
of total employment. From this standpoint, it might make sense to weight firms by firm size rather than 
the inverse of firm size. The problem is that we would still be left with inconsistent estimates. For all of 
these reasons, we prefer to use as our baseline the unweighted estimates reported in the previous tables. 
We also test for the robustness of our results to two alternatives: a framework based on a translog 
cost function and a framework based on CES production functions.  The translog approach has been 
adopted by Brainard and Riker (2001), Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2003) and Muendler and Becker 
(2006).  This alternative approach has the advantage that the translog cost function approximates many 
well behaved cost functions.  The translog total variable cost (TC) function (omitting time and parent 
subscripts) for wages W, investment prices r, research and development input prices t and output Y is 
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Differentiating ln TC with respect to ln Wj according to Shepard’s lemma, and allowing for a firm fixed 
effect, yields labor’s share in total costs in location j for parent i at time t: 
0 (6) ln ln ln ln ijt j ijt j ijt j jt j ijt i ijt
jjj j
LSHARE Y t w r f β ρκξ ϑ ε =+ + + + + + ∑ ∑∑∑ , 
where LSHARE is defined as the cost share of labor expenditures in location j for parent i in time t, 
relative to expenditures on labor and capital across all locations. 
  We report coefficient estimates for equation (6), substituting our price measures for output Y to 
avoid endogeneity concerns, and the implied Allen elasticities of substitution from the translog cost share 
approach, in Appendix Table A.6.   The coefficients on affiliate wages imply that foreign labor in 
horizontal multinationals substitutes for home labor in both high- and low-income affiliate locations.  The 
magnitudes for high-income affiliates are consistent with our first two approaches: in both vertical and 
horizontal firms, workers in high-income locations are substitutes for domestic employees.  In low-
income affiliates, however, employment is complementary with US employment. As expected, the own-
price elasticity is negative.   
For completeness, we also consider aggregating capital and labor across locations using a CES 
function (Katz and Murphy (1992) and Card (2001) use this approach). Thus we define L as follows: 
1 1
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where e represents productivity shocks, Li is the total quantity of labor used, and σ  is the Allen elasticity 
of substitution between labor in location i and j and is defined below.
9    




























where p are final goods prices at home and abroad and w are wages at home and abroad. The first-order 
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9 If sigma is equal to zero, we have the case of perfect complements (i.e. left shoes and right shoes, the leontief 
function that looks like L=min(Lh, Lf) this is obviously extreme but might be applicable to some kinds of natural 
resource extraction. The polar opposite is σ  tending to infinity (i.e. labor at home and labor abroad are perfect 
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Taking logs of both sides of (13a) and (13b) yields the following: 
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σσ σ =+ −−. 
Equations (14a) and (14b) underscore the fact that as long as there is some substitution (or 
complementarity) between domestic and foreign labor, the cost of labor abroad plays an important role in 
determining the demand for US labor. In addition, one of the restrictions of the CES specification is that 
the Allen elasticity of substitution between parent and low-income affiliates should be the same as the 
elasticity of substitution between parent and high-income affiliates.   
  The estimates are reported in Appendix Table A7.   The implied Allen elasticity of substitution, 
which is the negative of the reported coefficient estimate on wages, is positive for horizontally-integrated 
multinationals.  For horizontal firms, a one percentage point increase in the ratio of US to foreign affiliate 
wages would lead to a decline in US employment of between 0.16 and 0.19 percentage points. The CES 
approach corroborates the results in Tables 5 and 6 showing that affiliate labor in horizontal 
multinationals substitutes for parent employment.  For vertical multinationals, labor in low-income 
affiliates is complementary with US parent employment but labor in high-income affiliates substitutes for 
US parent employment. 
 
Comparing Elasticities of Labor Demand Across Specifications 
  All three approaches yield coefficient estimates which can be used to derive elasticities of factor 
demand η and Allen elasticities of substitution σ .  In equation (5), the key parameters are the elasticities 
of factor demand η .  Typically, inputs i and j are referred to as p-complements if  ij η  is less than zero, 
and p-substitutes if  ij η  is greater than zero.  The key parameters in equation (6) are the  j ξ ’s.  To convert  24
these into Allen partial elasticities of substitution between locations, we can calculate the following based 
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The Allen partial elasticity of substitution   jk σ  gives us the percentage change in the ratio of Lj to Lk with 
respect to the percentage change in the ratio of  wk to wj.  The Allen partial elasticity of substitution is 
directly estimated as the coefficient on relative wages using the CES approach (equations (14a) and 
(14b)). To convert the Allen partial elasticity of substitution into an elasticity of factor demand, we 
multiply by the factor share: 
ln / ln ij j ij i j sL w (16) η = σ = ∂ ∂  
 
  We report both Allen and factor price elasticities of substitution for each of the three estimation 
strategies in Table 7.  Factor shares are typically computed by taking the sample means of the data.
10  
Recall that a negative elasticity ij η  implies that an increase in foreign wages reduces the demand for US 
labor, while a positive sign indicates that US and foreign labor are price substitutes.  The different 
approaches suggest that home and affiliate employment are substitutes for horizontal multinationals but 
complements for vertically-integrated firms.  The price elasticity of demand  ij η is positive and significant 
for horizontal multinationals across all specifications, consistent with substitution between home and 
foreign affiliate employment.  The price elasticity appears to be between 0.02 and 0.03 in low-income 
affiliates and averages around 0.10 for high-income affiliates. In high-income affiliate locations, a 1 
percentage point increase in affiliate employment is associated with a 0.1 percentage point decline in US 
employment. The point estimates for horizontal multinationals are similar to those derived by Muendler, 
et al. (2006) and Brainard and Riker (2001) for low-income locations but higher in high-income affiliates. 
For vertical multinationals, the point estimates are consistently negative in low-income locations but not 
                                                           
10 Confidence intervals could be computed using bootstrapped standard errors.  25
precisely estimated for high-income locations.  The results imply that low-income employment is 
complementary with domestic employment in vertical multinationals, but again the magnitudes are not 
large: a 10 percentage point decline in foreign wages would be associated with a .3 percentage point 
increase in US employment.   
     We summarize the effects of factor price changes, trade, and technical change on US 
manufacturing employment in Table 8.  We combine the coefficient estimates presented in Table 5 with 
the actual mean changes in wages, investment prices, trade, research and development employment, and 
goods prices taken from Table 3.  We see that the major determinants of contraction in US manufacturing 
parent employment are (1) falling real prices of consumption goods (2), falling prices of investment goods 
(which incorporates the falling prices of computers), which makes it cheaper to substitute capital for 
labor, and (3) increasing import competition.  While the increase in home wages relative to affiliate wages 
has played a role for both vertical and horizontal multinationals, that effect is quantitatively small.  For 
horizontal foreign investment, the combined effects of higher domestic wages and falling foreign wages 
only account for a 4.5 percent decline in US employment.  In comparison, falling consumption prices 
account for an 11 percent decline, falling investment prices at home account for a 9 percent decline, and 
increasing import competition from low-wage countries accounts for a 6 percent decline in home 
employment.    For vertical multinationals, falling prices in low-income countries boosted employment by 
a small percentage, but falling domestic investment prices and  import competition again played a much 
more important role.  These figures suggest that high US labor costs are not the primary force behind the 
significant reduction in US employment of American multinational firms.  
  We have not allowed for the possibility that hiring workers abroad prevents a parent from 
shutting down operations. Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) study this counterfactual by asking what 
would have happened to low wage workers if imports from developing countries had been produced by 
US firms. In a similar spirit, we would like to know what might have happened to US workers if the 
parent had not hired workers in developing countries. Our dummy for employment in developing 
countries suggests that low-income affiliate activities have, in fact, preserved some jobs.  Table 8 shows 
that firms which expanded operations in low-income affiliate locations on average increased parent 
employment by 2 (for horizontal) to 3 (for vertical) percentage points. On the other hand, the gains from  26
operating in low-income countries were not sufficient to offset the negative effects on domestic parent 
employment of falling investment prices, falling consumer prices abroad, and increasing import 
competition. 
  
VI. Concluding Comments 
  This paper measures the impact of different forms of globalization on manufacturing employment 
by US multinationals in the United States. Over the period 1982 to 1999 manufacturing employment of 
US multinationals contracted by 4 million jobs, possibly foreshadowing the overall reduction in US 
manufacturing employment that accelerated from 1999 onwards. During this period, the number of 
workers hired by affiliates in developing countries increased while wages paid to these workers declined. 
these facts are consistent with the hypothesis that US parents are exporting low-wage jobs to low-income 
countries.  In this paper, we show that this hypothesis is only partially supported by the evidence. 
  The expansion of manufacturing employment in developing countries amounts to only one-quarter 
of the jobs lost at home. Our research shows that other factors—including technological change, and 
international trade—are much more important determinants of US manufacturing employment. Moreover, 
the results also suggest that job losses would have probably been even greater in the absence of expanded 
offshoring by US multinationals. 
  Using data on US based multinationals from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), we 
estimate the impact on US manufacturing employment of changes in foreign affiliate wages, controlling 
for changing demand conditions, import competition and technological change.  We find that the evidence 
on the links between offshoring and domestic employment is mixed, and that the effect depends on both 
the type and the location of foreign investment.  We conclude that the heterogeneity in effects is one 
reason why previous research on this topic has yielded such apparently contradictory results.  For firms 
most likely to perform the same tasks in foreign affiliates and at home (“horizontal” foreign investment), 
foreign and domestic employees appear to be substitutes. For these firms, lower wages in affiliate 
locations are associated with lower employment in the US.  However, for firms which do significantly 
different tasks at home and abroad (“vertical” foreign investment), foreign and domestic employment are 
complements.  The complementarity between domestic and foreign activities for vertically-integrated  27
firms is consistent with theoretical models developed by Grossman, Markusen, Maskus, and Rossi-
Hansberg. For vertical foreign investment, lower wages abroad are associated with higher US 
manufacturing employment.  
  However, even for horizontal multinationals, the negative impact of offshoring on US labor 
demand is small.  For horizontal foreign investment, the combined effects of higher domestic wages and 
falling foreign wages only accounts for a 4 percent decline in US employment.  In comparison, falling 
consumption prices account for an 11 percent decline, falling investment prices which have allowed firms 
to replace workers with computers or machines account for a 9 percent decline, and increasing import 
competition from low-wage countries accounts for a 6 percent decline in home employment.    For 
vertical multinationals, the gains from operating in low-income countries were not sufficient to offset the 
negative effects on domestic parent employment of falling investment prices, falling consumer prices 
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TRENDS IN MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT BY US MULTINATIONALS 1982-1999 
    1982 1989 1994 1999
Parents            
(1) BEA  Mfg    11,758 10,706 9,622 7,954
(2) Our  sample  10,689 9,668 9,104 7,564
 Vertical    5,812 5,581 4,958 4,963
 Horizontal    4,877 4,087 4,146 3,301
         
High-income Affiliates         
 Total    2,595 3,171 3,048 2,903
 Vertical    1,664 2,124 1,901 1,905
 Horizontal    932 1,048 1,147 998
         
Low-income Affiliates           
 Total    1,064 1,405 1,584 1,868
 Vertical    589 833 894 1,105
 Horizontal    475 571 690 764
         
All Affiliates            
 Total    3,659 4,576 4,632 4,772
 Vertical    2,253 2,957 2,795 3,010
 Horizontal    1,406 1,619 1,837 1,762
         
Affiliate Share of Employment         
 Total    26% 32% 34% 39%
 Vertical    28% 35% 36% 38%
 Horizontal    22% 28% 31% 35%
         
 
(1) Source: Mataloni (1994, 2007), Employment is by Industry of Parent and includes petroleum 
extraction and refining. 
(2) Our totals differ from the BEA's because we drop observations for which wages, employment, R&D 






DEFINING HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 






























.008 1.268  26.3    14.6  26.3 
-0.003 .018  1.261  15.2    14.3 33.6  Food 
 [0.004]           
0.004 .016  1.257  27.3    29.4 63.8  Beverages & Tobacco 
 [0.005]           
-0.005 .019  1.210  16.0    10.2 12.6  Leather Products 
 [0.010]           
0.053 .013  2.131  14.0 8.1  7.2  Wood Products 
 [0.514]           
-0.006 .016  1.010 9.9  7.5  10.7  Paper 
 [0.004]           
0.003 .027  1.211 5.1 6.2  9.2  Petroleum & Coal Products 
 [0.005]           
0.039 .072  0.866 9.7 7.0 14.0  Chemicals 
 [0.004]**           
0.016 .051  1.032  16.2  10.3 14.6  Plastics & Rubber 
 [0.004]**           
0.002 .024  1.387  17.3 9.5 17.1  Nonmetallic Minerals 
 [0.005]           
0.010 .043  1.253  12.1 6.8  8.4  Primary Metals 
 [0.005]*           
0.017 .048  0.953  14.0 8.9 11.4  Fabricated Metals 
 [0.004]**           
0.049 .082  0.781 9.0 6.2 13.0  Machinery 
 [0.004]**           
0.110 .143  0.550 7.9 5.8 12.8  Computer & Electronics 
 [0.005]**           
Electrical Equipment  0.042  .074  0.825  10.8  7.5  12.2 
 [0.006]**           
Transportation Equipment  0.021  .055  1.050  10.0  10.3  16.8 
 [0.004]**           
Furniture 0.011  .014  1.162  16.0  10.8  22.1 
 [0.007]           
Miscellaneous 0.060  .093  .726  12.5  10.5  16.5 
 [0.005]**           
Observations 3866           
R-squared 0.25           
 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
For a detailed description of which industries are included in miscellaneous see: 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics/NAICS33C.HTM#N339. Intrafirm trade is defined as the sum of exports to 
foreign affiliates for further processing plus imports from foreign affiliates, divided by sales. 
EHF is a measure of eye-hand-foot coordination required to perform manual tasks. The higher the value, the less 




CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES INTO LOW VERSUS HIGH INCOME CATEGORIES 
Country  
World Bank / Our 
Classification for Low 
versus High Income 
Nominal Manufacturing Wages 1994 in US Dollars  
BEA 
          
Estonia   Low      1,470 
Guyana   Low      1,504 
China   Low      1,579 
Malawi   Low      1,689 
Romania   Low      1,866 
Sri Lanka    Low    1,898 
Ukraine   Low      2,151 
India   Low      2,325 
Dominican Republic  Low     2,763 
Tanzania   Low      3,057 
Zimbabwe   Low      3,109 
Uzbekistan Low      3,136 
Zambia   Low      3,152 
Vietnam   Low      3,326 
Indonesia   Low      3,401 
Botswana   Low      3,517 
Pakistan   Low      3,631 
Nigeria   Low      3,940 
Honduras   Low      4,111 
Thailand   Low      4,168 
Costa Rica  Low    4,236 
Yemen, Rep.  Low     4,248 
Senegal   Low      4,318 
Philippines Low      4,427 
Slovak R.    Low    4,531 
Colombia   Low      4,603 
El Salvador  Low    4,622 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Low    4,756 
Fiji   Low      4,824 
Kenya   Low      5,098 
Malaysia   Low      5,334 
Hungary   Low      5,426 
Ghana   Low      5,475 
Poland   Low      5,540 
Jamaica   Low      5,557 
Ecuador   Low      5,596 
Panama   Low      6,453 
Mexico   Low      6,465 
Guatemala Low      6,786 
Trinidad and Tobago  Low    6,994 
Venezuela, RB  Low    7,393 
Swaziland   Low      7,500 
Russian Federation  Low    7,527 
Uruguay   Low      7,997 
Turkey   Low      8,370  33
Morocco   Low      8,422 
Tunisia   Low      9,058 
Nicaragua   Low      9,206 
Malta   Low      9,211 
Chile   Low      9,485 
South Africa  Low    10,257 
Barbados   Low      10,480 
Peru   Low      11,065 
Brazil   Low      11,227 
Singapore   High      11,885 
Portugal   High      14,236 
Bahamas, The  High     14,288 
Taiwan   High      14,699 
Saudi Arabia  Low     14,912 
Korea, Rep.  High    15,549 
Bahrain   High      16,047 
Netherlands Antilles  High    16,596 
Hong Kong, China  High    17,478 
New Zealand  High    17,736 
Argentina   Low      18,003 
Israel   High      19,572 
Greece   High      22,855 
Australia   High      23,313 
Ireland   High      23,392 
Spain   High      25,848 
United Kingdom  High    26,487 
Sweden   High      27,380 
Italy   High      30,574 
Austria   High      31,209 
Finland   High      32,049 
Denmark   High      32,934 
Norway   High      33,022 
United Arab Emirates  High     33,603 
France   High      33,628 
Aruba   High      34,745 
Canada   High      35,268 
Netherlands High      35,973 
Belgium   High      40,134 
Luxembourg High      43,614 
Germany   High      44,146 
Switzerland High      44,248 












SUMMARY STATISTICS: VERTICALLY-INTEGRATED FIRMS 







Log US employment  2088  7.327  1.570  -0.369  
US (domestic) Share in Labor Expenditures across all locations  2088  0.807  0.131  -0.041  
High-Income Affiliate Share in Labor Expenditures  2088  0.172  0.116  0.038  
Low-Income Affiliate Share in Labor Expenditures  2088  0.021  0.040  0.003  
Log US Manufacturing Wages, NBER  2088  3.394  0.155  0.177  
Log High-Income Affiliate Wages  2088  2.979  0.380  -0.170  
Log Low-Income Affiliate Wages  2088  2.319  1.088  -0.266  
Log US Price of Investment, NBER  2088  0.798  0.092  -0271  
Log Foreign Price of Investment, PWT  2088  0.675  0.264  -0.079  
Log Foreign Price of Consumer Goods, PWT  2088  0.712  0.283  -0.059  
U.S R&D Employees (% in Total Employment)  2088  0.091  0.091  0.043  
High-Income Affiliate R&D Employment (% in Total Employment)  2088  0.036  0.063  -0.024  
Low-Income Affiliate R&D Employment (% in Total Employment)  2088  0.005  0.016  -0.006  
Import Penetration, Schott  2088  0.178  0.108  0.146  
Import Penetration from Low-Income Countries, Schott  2088  0.044  0.040  0.062  
Percent Firms with Employees in Low-income Countries  2088  12.225  1.564  0.136  
Parent Sales by Industry  2088  9.649  1.406  0.348  
Affiliate Sales by Industry  2088  9.281  1.366  0.351  
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS: HORIZONTALLY-INTEGRATED FIRMS







Log US employment  1778  7.928  1.775  -0.239  
US (domestic) Share in Labor Expenditures across all locations  1778  0.834  0.137  -0.039  
High-Income Affiliate Share in Labor Expenditures  1778  0.140  0.126  0.036  
Low-Income Affiliate Share in Labor Expenditures  1778  0.025  0.046  0.005  
Log US Manufacturing Wages, NBER  1778  3.322  0.204  0.043  
Log High-Income Affiliate Wages  1778  3.001  0.363  -0.199  
Log Low-Income Affiliate Wages  1778  2.208  1.080  -0.189  
Log US Price of Investment, NBER  1778  0.827  0.040  -0.151  
Log Foreign Price of Investment, PWT  1778  0.647  0.259  -0.117  
Log Foreign Price of Consumer Goods, PWT  1778  0.674  0.276  -0.094  
U.S R&D Employment (% in Total Employment)  1778  0.031  0.050  0.003  
High-Income Affiliate R&D Employment (% in Total Employment)  1778  0.020  0.058  -0.023  
Low-Income Affiliate R&D Employment (% in Total Employment)  1778  0.006  0.023  -0.006  
Import Penetration, Schott  1778  0.127  0.085  0.082  
Import Penetration from Low-Income Countries, Schott  1778  0.0513  0.059  0.099  
Percent Firms with Employees in Low-income Countries  1778  12.828  1.733  0.092  
Parent Sales by Industry  1778  9.746  1.704  0.212  
Affiliate Sales by Industry  1778  9.486  1.651  0.244  
Unless indicated, variables are computed using the BEA benchmark surveys of direct investment abroad for the years  1982, 1989, 1994, 1999.  35
 
TABLE 5 
WITHIN ESTIMATES OF LABOR DEMAND BY US PARENTS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled  Vertical  Horizontal  F-test (p-value) for 
equality of 
coefficients for 
columns (2) and (3) 
Log US Industrial Wages  -0.398  -0.336  -0.518  0.105 
 [0.069]** 
 
[0.080]** [0.090]**  
Log Industrial Wages in    0.017  -0.032  0.027  0.000 
Low Income Countries  [0.033]* 
 
[0.007]** [0.008]**  
Log Industrial Wages   -0.031  -0.060  0.092  0.034 
High Income Countries 
 
[0.015]* [0.291]  [0.036]**   
Log of the US Price of   0.251  0.474  0.573  0.834 
Capital 
 
[0.160] [0.181]**  [0.406]  
Log of the Foreign Price   -0.338  -0.121  -0.587  0.114 
Of Capital 
 
[0.150]* [0.205]  [0.212]**   
Log of the Foreign Price   0.819  0.577  1.150  0.032 
Of Consumer Goods 
 
[0.149]** [0.198]** [0.208]**  
Import Penetration  0.031  -0.350  0.531  0.000 
 [0.120]  [0.116]**  [0.491]   
Import Penetration from   -0.143  0.327  -0.610  0.000 
Low Wage Countries 
 
[0.204] [0.291] [0.274]**   
R&D  (% Employment)  -0.475  -0.354  -0.913  0.013 
 [0.100]** 
 
[0.115]** [0.194]**  
R&D  (% Employment)   0.346  0.247  0.7  0.014 
In High-income Countries 
 
[0.164]* [0.190]  [0.312]*  
R&D  (%   1.399  1.905  1.271  0.122 
Employment) in Low-
income Countries 
[0.671]* [0.947]* [0.981]   
Dummy Equal to One if   0.223  0.231  0.173  0.000 
Firm has Employees in 
Low-income Countries 
[0.097]** [0.143]** [0.128]   
Time dummy 1989  -0.023  0.017  -0.001  0.819 
  [0.026] [0.036] [0.044]  
Time dummy 1994  -0.001  0.105  0.002  0.564 
 [0.036]  [0.051]*  [0.066]   
Time dummy 1999  0.154  0.268  0.196  0.744 
 [0.046]** 
 
[0.064]** [0.090]*   
Observations 3866  3866   
Number of firms  1868  1868   
R-squared 0.05  0.16   
Notes: Standard errors corrected for arbitrary heterskedasticity are in brackets.    * indcates significant at 5% while 
** indicates significant at 1%.  In column (1), we impose that the coefficients on horizontal and vertical 
multinationals are the same.  In columns (2) and (3) we allow the coefficients to differ.  Column (4) reports tests of 
the equality of coefficients across the two types of enterprises.  Dependent variable is the log of US employment.  
Within estimates calculated by taking deviations from firm-level means over the sample period.  Log industrial 
wages in high and low income countries taken from UNIDO database, INDSTAT3 (2006), based on surveys and 




WITHIN ESTIMATES OF US LABOR DEMAND USING UNIDO WAGES INSTEAD OF 
BEA WAGES IN LOW AND HIGH INCOME AFFILIATE LOCATIONS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Pooled  Vertical  Horizontal 
Log US Industrial Wages  -0.311  -0.299  -0.399 
  [0.079]** [0.077]** [0.088]** 
Log Industrial Wages in 
Low-income Countries   0.016  -0.025  0.031 
 [0.033]*  [0.007]**  [0.007]** 
Log Industrial Wages in 
High-income  Countries  -0.041 -0.061 0.092 
  [0.023]* [0.029]* [0.036]** 
Log of the US Price of 
Capital    0.121 0.411 0.373 
 [0.060]*  [0.112]**  [0.226] 
Log of the Foreign Price 
of  Capital  -0.338 -0.111 -0.518 
 [0.150]*  [0.191]  [0.209]** 
Log of the Foreign Price 
of Consumer Goods  0.723 0.579 0.970 
  [0.149]** [0.198]** [0.333]** 
Import  Penetration  -0.007 -0.389 0.444 
 [0.120]  [0.155]**  [0.694] 
Import Penetration from 
Low Wage Countries  -0.267  0.307  -0.734 
 [0.105]*  [0.292]  [0.334]** 
R&D  (%  Employment)  -0.482 -0.358 -0.915 
  [0.100]** [0.115]** [0.194]** 
R&D (% Employment) in 
High-income  Countries  0.345 0.243 0.720 
  [0.264] [0.190] [0.312]* 
R&D (% Employment) In 
Low-income  Countries  1.356 1.879 1.259 
  [0.671] [0.999] [0.982] 
Dummy Equal to One if 
Firm has Employees in 
Low-income Countries  0.232 0.214 0.183 
  [0.077]** [0.314]** [0.128] 
Time dummy 1989  -0.059  -0.073  -0.098 
  [0.038] [0.043] [0.101] 
Time dummy 1994  -0.062  -0.044  0.057 
  [0.040] [0.045] [0.115] 
Time dummy 1999  0.075  0.082  0.072 
  [0.046] [0.071] [0.071] 
Observations  3166 3166 3166 
Number of firms  1529                  1529 
R-squared  0.04                   0.15 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for arbitrary heterskedasticity are in brackets.    * indcates 
significant at 5% while** indicates significant at 1%.  In column (1), we impose that the 
coefficients on horizontal and vertical multinationals are the same.  In columns (2) and (3) we 
allow the coefficients to differ.  Dependent variable is the log of US employment.  Within 




























Implied Elasticity of Labor Demand and Allen Elasticity of Substitution Across Alternative Specifications 
























(Table A.6)  
(5) 
 
Adding Sales to 
Basic 
Specification 
       Implied Elasticity of Labor Demand ij η  
  (% Change in Li in Response to % Change in wj)        
             
     Own Elasticity of Labor Demand           
-0.336 -0.299 --  -0.126 -0.501            Vertical 
          Horizontal  -0.518  -0.399  --  -0.153  -0.658 
            Elasticity with respect to wages in Horizontal 
          Firms           
          Low-income Affiliate Locations  0.027 0.031 0.029  0.020 0.027 
          High-income Affiliate Locations   
 
0.092 0.092 0.087  0.125 0.077 
            Elasticity with respect to wages in Vertical  
          Firms           
          Low-income Affiliate Locations -0.032  -0.025 -0.033  -0.010 -0.032 
          High-income Affiliate Locations  -0.060  -0.061 0.051  0.162  -0.001 
        
      
       Implied Allen Elasticity of Substitution jk σ  
      
            Elasticity with respect to Low-income Countries 
      
.-1.51 -1.2  -1.381  -0.455  -1.50            Vertical 
           Horizontal  1.08  1.24  1.571  0.803  1.09 
            Elasticity with respect to High-income Countries 
      
-.351 -0.355  0.297  0.939 -0.006            Vertical 
           Horizontal  0.657  0.657  0.621  0.892  0.550 
        
      
Notes:  Coefficients taken from Tables 5 and 6 and Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7 in the text.  Factor shares used to compute elasticities taken from sample means 
(see Table 4).  See equations (15) and (16) for formulas to convert elasticities of labor demand into Allen elasticities of substitution and vice versa. The Allen 














Calculating the Impact of Different Aspects of Globalization on Labor Market Outcomes 
 
Factors Affecting 




































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log US Industrial 
Wages  -0.336  0.177  -5.947  -5.947  -0.518  0.043  -2.217  -2.217 
Log Industrial 
Wages in Low-
income Countries  -0.032  -0.266  0.851  0.851  0.027  -0.189  -0.510  -0.510 
Log Industrial 
Wages in High-
income Countries  -0.060  -0.170  1.020    0.092  -0.199  -1.831  -1.831 
Log of US Price of 
Capital  0.474  -0.271  -12.845  -12.845  0.573  -0.151  -8.652  -8.652 
Log of Foreign 
Price of Capital   -0.121  -0.079  0.956    -0.587  -0.117  6.868  6.868 
Log of Foreign 
Price of Consumer 
Goods  0.577  -0.059  -3.404  -3.404  1.150  -0.094  -10.810  -10.810 
Import Penetration 
  -0.351  0.146  -5.125  -5.125  0.531  0.082  4.354   
Import Penetration 
form Low Wage 
Countries  0.327  0.062  2.027    -0.610  0.099  -6.039  -6.039 
R&D Employment 
  -0.354  0.043  -1.522  -1.522  -0.913  0.003  -0.274  -0.274 
R&D Employment 
in High-income 
Countries  0.247  -0.024  -0.593    0.730  -0.023  -1.679  -1.679 
R&D Employment 
in Low-income 
Countries  1.905  -0.006  -1.143  -1.143  1.271  -0.006  -0.763   
Dummy =1if firm 
has employees in 
Developing Ctries   0.231 0.136 3.142 3.142 0.173 0.092 1.592   
Net Impact of all 
Above Variables 
     -22.578  -25.993     -19.941  -25.144 
Adding Parent 
Sales 
  0.142  0.348  4.942  4.942  0.163  0.212  3.456  3.456 
Adding Affiliate 
Sales 
  0.036  0.348  1.253  1.253  0.124  0.244  3.026  3.026 
Net effect 
including Parent 
and Affiliate Sales      -16.383  -19.798     -13.459  -18.662 
Notes: coefficients in columns (1) and (5) taken from Table 5.  Numbers in columns (2) and (6) taken from means Table 4.  Numbers is columns (3) and (7) 
calculated by multiplying by 100  column (1) and column (2) (for column (3)) and column (5) and column (6) (for column (7)).  Columns (4) and (8) 
calculated the same way as columns (3) and (7), but only the coefficients which were significant in Table 5 are reported.  The Net Impact column sums up 
all the previous effects.   39
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE A.1:COVERAGE OF THE BEA SAMPLE 
Year and Variable  Coverage of BEA 
Sample in 
Manufacturing 
Coverage of BEA 
Sample in Services 
Coverage of BEA 






1982      
Total Number of Employees in BEA Sample 
(Thousands) 
11,758.1 993.8  18,704.6 
Gross Product in the BEA Sample (US Millions 
of Dollars)  
421,050 25,997  796,017 
Coverage of the BEA Sample (in %) Relative to 
Gross Product for All Firms operating in the US 
80 %  6 %  33 % 
Value of Dollar Export Sales by Firms in the 
BEA Sample (Millions) 
163,383 NA  NA 
Coverage of the Bea Sample (in %) Relative to 
Exports of All Firms operating in the US  
77 %  NA  NA 
1989      
Total Number of Employees in BEA Sample 
(Thousands) 
10,706.8 1,700  18,785.4 
Gross Product in the BEA Sample (US Millions 
of Dollars)  
586,568 57,090  1,044,884 
Coverage of the BEA Sample (in %) Relative to 
Gross Product for All Firms operating in the US 
67 %  6 %  25 % 
Value of Dollar Export Sales by Firms in the 
BEA Sample (Millions) 
236,371 NA  NA 
Coverage of the Bea Sample (in %) Relative to 
Exports of All Firms operating in the US  
65 %  NA  NA 
1994      
Total Number of Employees in BEA Sample 
(Thousands) 
9,622.5 2,653.4 18,947.4 
Gross Product in the BEA Sample (US Millions 
of Dollars)  
690,466 102,520 1,325,945 
Coverage of the BEA Sample (in %) Relative to 
Gross Product for All Firms operating in the US 
59 %  8 %  26 % 
Value of Dollar Export Sales by Firms in the 
BEA Sample (Millions) 
337,036 NA  NA 
Coverage of the Bea Sample (in %) Relative to 
Exports of All Firms operating in the US  
59 %  NA  NA 
1999      
Total Number of Employees in BEA Sample 
(Thousands) 
7,954.9 2,220,174  23,006.8 
Value of Dollar Export Sales by Firms in the 
BEA Sample  (Millions) 
441,587 NA  NA 
Coverage of the Bea Sample (in %) Relative to 
Exports of All Firms operating in the US  
62.5 %  NA  NA  40
APPENDIX TABLE A.2: 
CROSS CHECKING THE ACCURACY OF THE BEA DATABASE 
  Imposing a Cut-off (Reporting 
Requirement of a Balance Sheet 
Total of at least 7 Million Euros for 
Germany, US reporting 
requirements vary over time, no 
reporting requirement for Sweden)  
Imposing no Cut-off on Germany 
affiliate reporting 
BEA Data     
Employees of US Affiliates in 1999 
in Germany 
458,744 NA 
Employees of US Affiliates in 1999 
in Sweden 
67,044 NA 
   
German Government Data (Direct 
US Ownership only) 
  
Employees of US Affiliates in 1998  466,941  488,866 
Employees of US Affiliates in 1999  509,537  532,594 




Swedish Government Data     
Employees of US Affiliates in 1997 
(Majority owned only) 
51,138 NA 
Employees of US Affiliates in 1998 
yoo(Majority owned only 
61,089 NA 
Employees of US Affiliates in 1999 

















APPENDIX TABLE A.3:  
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
Variable Name  Source  Description 
Log Wage (Industry level)  US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Wages and salaries of employees and employer expenditures for all 
employee benefit plans in parents computed separately for parents, 
high-income affiliates and other affiliates and averaged across 
industries. 
 
Log Wage (Industry level) 
 
UNIDO                          Wages calculated based on surveys administered by UNIDO, 
supplemented with secondary sources (such as national statistical 
agencies).  Wages calculated as compensation divided by number 
of  employees at the 3 digit ISIC level Revision 2.  All values 
converted to US dollars using the IMF exchange rate series rf.  Data 
taken from INDSTAT3, published in 2006 by UNIDO. 
 
Log Employment   US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Log of the number of full-time and part-time employees on the 
payroll at the end of the fiscal year in all affiliates.  However, a 
count taken during the year was accepted if it was a reasonable 
proxy for the end-of-year number. Computed separately for parents, 
high-income affiliates and other affiliates. 
R&D Share 
R&D Share (High-income Affiliates) 
R&D Share (Low-income Affiliates) 
US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Number of employees in research and development as a percentage 
of total employment. Computed separately for US parents, affiliates 
in high-income locations and affiliates in low-income locations. 
US Investment Price  NBER Manufacturing 
Database 
This is the variable PIINV in the NBER’s manufacturing 
productivity database.    It is set to 1 in 1987.  It combines separate 
deflators for structures and equipment, based on the distribution of 
each type of asset in the industry.  This is a deflator for new 
investment flows, not the existing capital stock.  See 
www.nber.org. 
Foreign Investment Price  Penn World Tables  PPP price of domestic investment calculated from the PWT 6.1.  
See Appendix for PWT 6.1 for more details, or 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu. 
Foreign Consumer Goods Price  Penn World Tables  PPP price of consumption goods calculated from the PWT 6.1.  See 
Appendix for PWT 6.1 for more details, or 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu. 
US Import Penetration  Bernard, Jensen and 
Schott (2006) 
Imports into the US divided by imports into the US plus total 
production in the US less exports from the US by year by 4-digit 
SIC 1987 revision code industrial classification. 
US Import Penetration from Low-Income 
Countries 
Bernard, Jensen and 
Schott (2006) 
Share of products in an industry sourced from at least one country 













APPENDIX TABLE A.4 
WITHIN ESTIMATES OF LABOR DEMAND BY US PARENTS  
WITH INDUSTRY SALES ADDED AS  A CONTROL 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Pooled  Vertical  Horizontal 






     








     








     








     








     
Log of the Foreign Price 







     
Import  Penetration  -0.098 -0.523 0.296 
 [0.120]  [0.156]**  [0.194] 
     
Import Penetration from 







     
R&D Spending (% Sales)  -0.494  -0.344  -1.016 
  [0.099]** [0.114]** [0.194]** 
     
R&D Spending (% Sales) 







     
R&D Spending (% Sales) 







     
Dummy Equal to One if 








     








     








     


















Observations  3866 3866 3866 
Number  of  firms  1868 1868 1868 
R-squared  0.07 0.18 0.18 
Standard errors in brackets   
   * significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
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Appendix Table A.5 
Correcting For Selection 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 






 Vertical  Vertical  Horizontal Horizontal 








      










      










      










      










      
Log of the Foreign Price 









      
Import Penetration  -0.357  -0.398  0.529  0.980 
 [0.122]**  [0.121]**  [0.532]  [0.910] 
      
Import Penetration from 









      
R&D  (% Employment)  -0.354  -0.250  -0.911  -1.061 
  [0.136]** [0.125]*  [0.411]** [0.513]* 
      
R&D  (% Employment) 









      











         
Dummy Equal to One if 










      





























Observations  3866 3866 3866 3866 
Number  of  firms  1868 1868 1868 1868 
Standard errors in 
brackets 
  * significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 




APPENDIX TABLE A.6 
TRANSLOG COST SHARE SPECIFICATION: DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS 
US WAGE BILL AS A SHARE OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES ON LABOR 
ACROSS ALL LOCATIONS 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Pooled  Vertical  Horizontal 








      








      








      
σjj  :  own elasticity  -0.167 -0.156 -0.184 
σjk : low income countries  0.303 -0.455  0.803 
σjk : high income countries  1.106 0.939 0.892 
      








      








      
Log of the Foreign Price 







      
Import Penetration  -0.005  -0.040  0.049 
 [0.020]  [0.026]  [0.031] 
      








      
R&D Employment  -0.018  -0.021  -0.039 
 [0.017]  [0.019]  [0.034] 
      








        








      
Dummy Equal to One if 








      


















Observations 3866  3866  3866 
Number of firms  1898  1898  1898 
R-squared 0.20  0.31  0.31 
Standard errors in brackets       
   * significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 




APPENDIX TABLE A.7 
CES SPECIFICATION: DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS RATIO OF LOG EMPLOYMENT AT HOME TO LOG EMPLOYMENT ABROAD 
REPORTED COEFFICIENT IS ON THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE : (LOG) WAGES AT HOME RELATIVE TO WAGES ABROAD 
COEFFICIENT IS (THE NEGATIVE OF) THE IMPLIED ALLEN ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION ij σ  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pooled  Pooled  Vertical  Vertical Horizontal Horizontal 
Log of the Ratio of US 
Wages to Wages in High-
income Countries 
-0.146 






        
Log of the Ratio of US 








        
Log of the Foreign Price 













           
Import  Penetration  -0.208 -0.414 -0.586 -0.332 0.278  -0.244 
 [0.170]  [0.388]  [0.217]**  [0.546] [0.260] [0.484] 
        
Import Penetration from 














R&D Spending (% 













        














           














        




































Observations  3866 1254 3866 1254 3866 1254 
Number  of  firms 1868  598 1868  598 1868  598 
R-squared  0.10 0.18 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.19 
Standard  errors  in  brackets        
   * significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
      
 
 